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Abstract
The last two decades have seen an explosion in research analysing cultural change as a 
Darwinian evolutionary process. Here I provide an overview of the theory of cultural 
evolution, including its intellectual history, major theoretical tenets and methods, key 
findings, and prominent criticisms and controversies. ‘Culture’ is defined as socially 
transmitted information. Cultural evolution is the theory that this socially transmitted 
information evolves in the manner laid out by Darwin in The Origin of Species, i.e. it 
comprises a system of variation, differential fitness and inheritance. Cultural evolution is 
not, however, neo-Darwinian, in that many of the details of genetic evolution may not 
apply, such as particulate inheritance and random mutation. Following a brief history of 
this idea, I review theoretical and empirical studies of cultural microevolution, which 
entails both selection-like processes wherein some cultural variants are more likely to be 
acquired and transmitted than others, plus transformative processes that alter cultural 
information during transmission. I also review how phylogenetic methods have been used
to reconstruct cultural macroevolution, including the evolution of languages, technology 
and social organisation. Finally, I discuss recent controversies and debates, including the 
extent to which culture is proximate or ultimate, the relative role of selective and 
transformative processes in cultural evolution, the basis of cumulative cultural evolution, 
the evolution of large-scale human cooperation, and whether social learning is learned or 
innate. I conclude by highlighting the value of using evolutionary methods to study culture
for both the social and biological sciences.
Keywords: cultural evolution; cultural transmission; cumulative culture; demography; 
human evolution; social learning.
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Introduction
Cultural evolution is the theory that cultural change in humans and other species can be 
described as a Darwinian evolutionary process, and consequently that many of the 
concepts, tools and methods used by biologists to study biological evolution can be 
equally profitably applied to study cultural change (Mesoudi 2011a; Richerson and Boyd 
2005; Richerson and Christiansen 2013). ‘Culture’ here entails any socially (rather than 
genetically) transmitted information, such as beliefs, knowledge, skills or practices. Just 
as biologists seek to explain the diversity and complexity of life and living organisms, 
cultural evolution researchers seek to explain the diversity and complexity of culture and 
cultural phenomena.
Evolutionary biologists to whom I speak are sometimes surprised by the depth and 
diversity of modern cultural evolution research. Just three decades ago cultural evolution 
research was the almost-secret passion of a handful of scholars, and limited in method to
rather technical mathematical models (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Cavalli-Sforza and 
Feldman 1981). The last two decades, however, have seen an explosion in cultural 
evolution research. The use of mathematical models continues to occupy the core of the 
field (Aoki and Feldman 2014; Enquist et al. 2011; Kempe et al. 2014; Lehmann et al. 
2011; H. M. Lewis and Laland 2012; McElreath and Henrich 2006), but has been 
supplemented with laboratory experiments testing the assumptions and predictions of 
those models (Derex et al. 2013; Kempe et al. 2012; Kirby et al. 2008; McElreath et al. 
2008; Mesoudi and Whiten 2008; T. J. H. Morgan et al. 2011); field studies doing the same
in real-life settings (Aunger 2000; Henrich and Henrich 2010; Hewlett et al. 2011; Reyes-
Garcia et al. 2009); phylogenetic studies that reconstruct the evolutionary relationships 
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between languages (Bouckaert et al. 2012; Dunn et al. 2011; Pagel 2009), artefacts (Lipo 
et al. 2006; Lycett 2009; O’Brien et al. 2014; Tehrani and Collard 2002) and texts 
(Barbrook et al. 1998; Ross et al. 2013; Tehrani 2013); the study of historical dynamics 
using ecological models (Turchin 2008; Turchin et al. 2013); and the comparative study of 
non-human culture using many of the same methods as applied to humans (Dean et al. 
2014; Laland and Galef 2009; Lycett et al. 2007; Whiten 2005).
The aim of this article is to review the theoretical foundations of this burgeoning work, 
provide some examples of how evolutionary concepts and methods have illuminated 
cultural phenomena, and explore recent controversies and outstanding research 
questions in the field.
A brief history of cultural evolution
Long before Darwin published The Origin of Species in 1859, historical linguists were 
constructing trees of historical descent for languages, based on the principle that more 
similar contemporary languages most likely shared a more recent common ancestor (van 
Wyhe 2005). In other words, that languages - which are socially transmitted, given that 
there are no genes for specific languages such as English or Hindi - gradually evolve over 
time and thus show the same descent with modification that Darwin was later to apply to 
species. It is unclear whether these linguistic trees directly influenced Darwin (although 
intriguingly, one of the major proponents of historical linguistics in England was Hensleigh
Wedgwood, Darwin’s cousin and future brother-in-law: van Wyhe 2005). It is clear, 
however, that Darwin very quickly saw clear parallels between how species and 
languages change over time:
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“The formation of different languages and of distinct species, and the 
proofs that both have been developed through a gradual process, are 
curiously parallel...We find in distinct languages striking homologies 
due to community of descent. The frequent presence of rudiments, 
both in languages and in species, is still more remarkable. Dominant 
languages and dialects spread widely, and lead to the gradual 
extinction of other tongues. A language, like a species, when once 
extinct, never reappears. We see variability in every tongue, and new 
words are continually cropping up; but as there is a limit to the powers 
of the memory, single words, like whole languages, gradually become 
extinct. The survival or preservation of certain favoured words in the 
struggle for existence is natural selection.” (Darwin 1871, p. 90)
Here, Darwin went further than merely applying the notion of common descent to 
languages, as the linguists had done. He also applied his mechanism of natural selection 
to language change. Similar parallels were drawn between biological evolution and 
technological evolution by Augustus Pitt-Rivers around the same time (Pitt-Rivers 1875), 
whose museum in Oxford was, and still is, innovative in displaying archaeological and 
ethnographic items according to their presumed evolutionary relationships, rather than 
their age or collector.
In an alternative universe, these strands of evolutionary thinking in the social sciences 
would have matured into a quantitative and rigorous science of cultural evolution, in the 
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same way that evolutionary theory became established in the biological sciences via 
population genetics models in the early 1900s and then the evolutionary synthesis in the 
1940s (Mayr 1982). Sadly, cultural evolution instead took an unfortunate wrong turn. In 
the late 1800s several anthropologists and sociologists devised schemes of cultural 
evolution based not on Darwin’s theory of descent-based trees and natural selection, but 
rather on Herbert Spencer’s progressive, ladder-like, unilinear theory of evolution 
(Freeman 1974). These schemes, such as those of Morgan (1877) and Tylor (1871), saw 
cultural evolution as the inevitable progress of entire societies along a sequence of fixed 
stages of increasing advancement, starting at savagery and barbarism, and ending at 
civilisation. ‘Civilisation’ typically resembled the Victorian English or American societies of 
the schemes’ authors. 
The racist tones of these theories is obvious today but not unusual in that time of cultural 
imperialism, and these Spencerian schemes were often used to justify the subjugation of 
supposedly ‘less evolved’ societies by ‘more evolved’ ones, frequently mixed in with 
ideas of eugenics. A later wave of anthropologists such as Franz Boas (Boas 1940; see H.
S. Lewis 2001) quite correctly rejected these progressive Spencerian theories not just 
because of their political motivation but also, perhaps more importantly, because they 
have little empirical basis. Entire societies simply do not fit into neat stages of increasing 
complexity. For many socio-cultural anthropologists today, however, this association 
between evolution and stage-like progression remains. It is worth emphasising that these 
progressive Spencerian theories are not what is meant by ‘cultural evolution’ today, which
draws on Darwin’s theory of evolution rather than Spencer’s, the latter of which resembles
the development of an individual rather than the evolution of a population.
6
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
During the mid-twentieth century a few isolated scholars maintained that a properly 
Darwinian theory of cultural evolution was viable, such as the psychologist Donald 
Campbell (Campbell 1965). Richard Dawkins provoked interest but little actual empirical 
research with his notion of the ‘meme’ in the final chapter of The Selfish Gene (Dawkins 
1976), intended to illustrate the substrate-neutrality of his replicator-based theory of 
evolution. However, just as evolutionary theory in the biological sciences only really 
became useful once it had been formalised mathematically by population geneticists 
such as Fisher, Haldane and Wright in the early 1900s, cultural evolution only really took 
off once two pairs of scholars devised quantitative mathematical models of cultural 
evolution in two books in the 1980s: one by Marc Feldman and Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza 
(Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981) and the other by Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson 
(Boyd and Richerson 1985). These books were also notable in taking seriously the 
differences between biological and cultural evolution, rather than simply importing 
biological analogies to the cultural case, as perhaps both Campbell and Dawkins were 
guilty of doing. The following section outlines the theoretical basis of cultural evolution as 
presented in these books, and which has inspired much subsequent research.
The theory of cultural evolution
Many textbook definitions of evolution talk of changes in gene frequencies or require 
Mendelian rules of genetic inheritance. While this is reasonable when one’s focus is 
exclusively on biological (i.e. genetic) evolution, Darwin’s theory can quite easily be 
formulated in a general, mechanism-neutral manner. After all, Darwin himself knew 
nothing about genes or Mendelian inheritance when he wrote The Origin. Lewontin (1970) 
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expressed this generality by defining evolution as comprising three principles, each of 
which were clearly specified in The Origin:
1. Different entities in a population vary in their characteristics (principle of variation)
2. These entities have different rates of survival and reproduction (principle of differential 
fitness, or what Darwin called a ‘struggle for existence’)
3. There is a correlation between parent and offspring entities in those characteristics that
contribute to differential fitness (principle of inheritance)
Lewontin (1970) goes on to state that:
“It is important to note a certain generality in the principles. No 
particular mechanism of inheritance is specified, but only a correlation 
in fitness between parent and offspring. The population would evolve 
whether the correlation between parent and offspring arose from 
Mendelian, cytoplasmic, or cultural inheritance.” Lewontin (1970, p.1).
The theory of cultural evolution holds that cultural change can be described by these 
three general principles (Mesoudi et al. 2004), as Lewontin (1970) alludes to when he talks
of cultural inheritance1. Thus, cultural traits (words, ideas, artefacts etc.) exhibit variation; 
these variants have different rates of survival and reproduction; and they are transmitted 
1 Confusingly, the terms ‘social learning’, ‘social transmission’, ‘cultural transmission’, 
‘cultural inheritance’ and variants thereof are used interchangeably within the field, to 
denote the passing of information non-genetically from one individual to another. Here I 
stick to the term ‘social learning’, although this may differ from cited sources.
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from person to person via social learning mechanisms such as imitation or speech. 
To give a concrete example, Lieberman et al. (2007) used vast quantitative databases of 
English verb usage over the past 1200 years to show that, at any single point in time, 
verbs have often varied in their past tense form, including regular (e.g. chided) and 
irregular (e.g. chid, chode) forms (principle of variation), and that regular forms have 
steadily displaced irregular forms particularly for those verbs that are infrequently used 
(principle of differential fitness). Given that verb form is learned from others just like other 
aspects of one’s language (Harris 1995; Labov 1972), the principle of inheritance is also 
observed. So this provides quantitative support for Darwin’s informal suggestion in the 
quote above that words vary, they compete for expression, and they are transmitted from 
person to person. Thus, they evolve. Similar observations can be made for technology, 
such as the replacement of traditional seed corn with hybrid seed corn in Iowa during the 
1940s (Henrich 2001; Ryan and Gross 1943), or any number of other well-documented 
examples of the diffusion of innovations (E. Rogers 1995) and changing frequencies of 
archaeological artefacts such as pottery types (Shennan 2002).
Beyond these three general principles derived from The Origin, no further assumptions 
are made about the mechanisms by which the principles operate. We do not need to – 
and often should not – impose mechanisms that are specific to biological evolution onto 
cultural evolution. These might include the mechanisms of genetic inheritance, such as 
the acquisition of information in equal contribution from two parents or the existence of 
discrete units that are inherited in a particulate fashion, or the randomness of genetic 
mutation with respect to fitness. In Mesoudi (2011a), I expressed this as follows: cultural 
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evolution is Darwinian, in that it comprises the three general principles of variation, 
differential fitness and inheritance as laid out by Darwin in The Origin, but it is not neo-
Darwinian, in that it may not necessarily exhibit the specific mechanisms of genetic 
inheritance, random mutation etc. that biologists subsequent to Darwin discovered and 
that were integrated into evolutionary theory during the evolutionary synthesis.
Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson (1985) constructed 
quantitative mathematical models of cultural evolution using the tools of population 
genetics, and which clearly made this distinction. Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) 
constructed models that explored the transmission of cultural traits not only from one’s 
biological parents (vertical social learning) but also from peers (horizontal social learning) 
and from older unrelated members of the parental generation (oblique social learning). 
They constructed models of cultural mutation, analogous to genetic mutation, where 
novel cultural traits appear at random; cultural selection, analogous to natural selection, 
where certain cultural traits are more likely to be learned and transmitted than others; and 
cultural drift, an analogue of genetic drift, where cultural traits change in frequency due to 
chance. They explored the consequences of migration and other demographic processes 
for cultural diversity. They also modelled the evolution of continuous cultural traits, 
abandoning the assumption of discrete replicators and particulate inheritance. Contrary to
Dawkins (1976), these models demonstrated that discrete replicators are not necessary 
for evolution, all that is required is some form of variation, be it discrete or continuous, 
and some form of inheritance, be it particulate or blending (Henrich and Boyd 2002). 
Boyd and Richerson (1985) constructed models adding psychological realism to the 
10
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
notion of cultural selection, modelling cases where people preferentially copy the traits of 
successful or prestigious individuals (indirect or prestige bias), copy traits on the basis of 
their popularity (frequency-dependent bias, with positive frequency-dependence called 
conformity, and negative frequency-dependence called anti-conformity), or copy traits 
based on their intrinsic characteristics (e.g. their memorability or usefulness, known as 
direct or content bias). They also constructed models whereby individuals transform 
cultural traits in particular, non-random directions (‘guided variation’, in contrast to 
random genetic mutation). Finally, they explored the interaction between genetic and 
cultural evolution, examining the conditions under which social learning might genetically 
evolve, which led to analyses of specific cases of gene-culture coevolution (Feldman and 
Laland 1996; Laland et al. 2010).
These models concern the equivalent of what biologists would call microevolution. The 
following years saw the introduction of phylogenetic methods to reconstruct cultural 
macroevolution, within anthropology (Mace and Pagel 1994), linguistics (Gray and 
Atkinson 2003; Gray and Jordan 2000; Pagel 2009), and archaeology (O’Brien et al. 2001; 
O’Brien and Lyman 2003). These focus less on the within-population mechanisms of 
cultural microevolution, and more on reconstructing evolutionary relationships between 
languages, artefacts and customs, given the insight that these traits are related by 
evolutionary descent (Gray et al. 2007; Lipo et al. 2006; Pagel 2009). Just as in biology, 
this concerns constructing the most likely evolutionary tree given the data, distinguishing 
between homoplasies and homologies, and using trees to test hypotheses using the 
comparative method controlling for the non-independence of data points due to common 
descent (here, cultural rather than genetic descent). Also as in biology, initial use of 
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maximum parsimony has given way to more sophisticated Bayesian Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) methods (Matthews et al. 2011; Pagel 2009).
In summary, cultural evolution theory rests on the principle that cultural change is 
Darwinian, in that it exhibits variation, differential fitness and inheritance (Mesoudi et al. 
2004). It does not, however, require that these processes follow neo-Darwinian principles, 
such as particulate inheritance or random mutation (Mesoudi 2011a). Population-genetic-
like mathematical models have formalised the processes that are thought to drive cultural 
microevolution, including psychological decision-making processes such as conformity or
memory biases, and demographic processes such as migration or drift. Phylogenetic 
methods have been used to reconstruct cultural macroevolution based on the principle of
inheritance. Much subsequent work has been devoted to using lab experiments, field 
studies of real-life populations, and historical/archaeological data to test the assumptions 
and predictions of these theoretical models. The following section highlights some key 
findings that have emerged from this theoretical foundation. 
Key findings in the field
The following comprises a subjective selection of what I consider to be the major 
advances in cultural evolution research in the last decade or so, although there is much 
that I have not included due to space constraints. I have tried to select examples that 
have been addressed using multiple methods (models, experiments, field studies, 
historical analyses) and replicated by multiple independent labs. There is a tendency to 
focus on humans, again because of space constraints, but many of the same findings 
equally apply to non-human species. I start with key findings related to cultural 
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microevolution, and gradually move to cultural macroevolution.
Social learning is payoff-biased and conformist
Evolutionary models predict that social learners should be selective in when and who they
copy (Boyd and Richerson 1995; Enquist et al. 2007; Laland 2004), otherwise social 
learning confers no adaptive benefits compared to asocial learning (A. R. Rogers 1988). 
Two key social learning biases, first introduced and modelled by Boyd and Richerson 
(1985), concern who one learns from. Payoff bias (also labelled indirect bias, success bias,
or copy-successful-individuals) involves copying individuals who demonstrate some 
degree of success in terms of high or higher payoffs. Various forms of payoff bias have 
been modelled, including copying the individual with the highest absolute payoff, copying
another individual if that other individual’s payoff is higher than one’s own, or copying in 
proportion to the difference between own and other’s payoffs (Schlag 1998), but they all 
have in common some assessment of payoffs to behaviour. ‘Payoff’ may be defined 
biologically (e.g. feeding or reproductive success) or culturally (e.g. wealth, social power), 
which may or may not coincide.
An alternative is conformist bias (also labelled positive frequency-dependent bias or copy-
the-majority), which involves being disproportionately more likely to copy the most 
common behaviour in the population irrespective of its payoff (Henrich and Boyd 1998). 
For example, if 6 out of 10 peers exhibit behaviour A rather than B, a conformist learner 
would have a greater than 0.6 chance of adopting behaviour A (copying A with exactly 0.6
probability would describe an unbiased social learner, while copying A with less than 0.6 
probability would be anti-conformist).
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Subsequent experiments have shown that people employ both of these social learning 
strategies, as predicted, but that payoff bias is typically preferred to conformity. McElreath
et al. (2008) found this using a simple two-option task of planting wheat or potatoes 
where one gave higher yields, Morgan et al. (2011) using various tasks including mental 
rotation and perceptual judgements, and Mesoudi (2011b) using a more complex artifact-
design task. In each of these, participants could employ trial-and-error asocial learning, or
use some form of social learning. A notable recent study by Molleman et al. (2014) found 
that participants were more likely to employ payoff bias in a two-option task where one 
option always has a higher payoff, but more likely to use conformity in social dilemma, 
coordination and evasion games where payoffs depend on other participants’ behaviour.
Less research has examined these biases outside the lab, in natural settings, but findings 
generally reflect the experimental results. Henrich and Henrich (2010) showed that 
pregnant women in Fijian fishing villages preferentially acquire adaptive food taboos from 
locally prestigious unrelated older women, consistent with prestige bias. Beheim et al. 
(2014) analysed records of opening moves of professional players of the popular East 
Asian board game Go, showing the preferential copying of the moves of successful 
players. These findings fit with data from sociology on the diffusion of innovations (E. 
Rogers 1995) showing that innovations often spread via successful or high status ‘change
agents’, and sociolinguistics (Labov 1972) showing that dialect change spreads via the 
imitation of successful or prestigious individuals. Perhaps mirroring the experimental 
results, conformity in the sense modelled by Boyd and Richerson (1985) has received less
clear non-experimental support. Henrich (2001) argued that long-tailed S-shaped 
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diffusion curves of technological innovations are indicative of conformity, but such curves 
may also be consistent with other underlying learning biases (Kandler and Steele 2009).
The predictions derived from evolutionary models are not specific to humans. Indeed, 
recent experiments show just as good evidence for payoff bias and conformity in fish, 
birds and mammals. Pike et al. (2010) showed that nine-spined sticklebacks abandoned a
food patch they had previously learned was optimal when they observed a demonstrator 
feeding at a higher-payoff patch. Conformity has been demonstrated in stickleback (Pike 
and Laland 2010) and great tits (Aplin et al. 2014), with an individual fish or bird 
disproportionately more likely to feed at a location where a majority of other individuals 
had fed. These studies with phylogenetically diverse species show that adaptive social 
learning rules likely evolved independently in response to particular ecological conditions 
rather than exclusively in our own species’ recent ancestors. Indeed, chimpanzees are 
surprisingly reluctant to switch to higher-payoff behaviours (Marshall-Pescini and Whiten 
2008; although see Yamamoto et al. 2013) and while they do exhibit social learning, and 
this is sometimes labelled ‘conformity’ (e.g. Whiten et al. 2005), conformity has not been 
demonstrated in chimpanzees in the specific sense of being disproportionately more 
likely to copy the majority (van Leeuwen and Haun 2013).
Why are these social learning strategies important? A key advantage of Darwinian 
population thinking is that we can extrapolate from small-scale individual-level decisions 
to large-scale population-level patterns. It has been argued (Boyd and Richerson 1995; 
Enquist and Ghirlanda 2007; Henrich 2004; Mesoudi 2011c) that payoff-biased social 
learning is a crucial component of cumulative cultural evolution, whereby beneficial traits 
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are selectively preserved and built upon over successive generations (Tomasello 1999). It 
is not difficult to see why: only payoff bias will drive populations to selectively preserve 
and build upon beneficial traits. It has also been argued that some forms of payoff-bias, 
particularly ones that use more indirect measures of success like prestige, can generate 
prestige hierarchies as people pay costs in terms of deference or material goods in 
exchange for access to skilled people’s knowledge (Henrich and Gil-White 2001). While 
broadly adaptive, this may misfire when the sources of prestige are disconnected from 
the sources of success (Atkisson et al. 2011), and may lead to runaway selection for 
excessive indicators of success (Boyd and Richerson 1985). Conformity, meanwhile, has 
been suggested as a means to maintain between-group cultural variation, given that it 
forces migrants to adopt the majority behaviour of their new group (Henrich and Boyd 
1998). Some have suggested that selection may then act on these homogenous cultural 
groups, favouring the emergence of group-level adaptations (Henrich and Boyd 2001).
Cognitive biases can drive cultural evolution towards cultural attractors
A general principle of biological evolution is that inheritance alone does not cause 
evolutionary change, except in rare cases such as meiotic drive. This is formalised in the 
Hardy-Weinberg principle, as well as the Price equation (Price 1970), where for biological 
systems the component that specifies evolutionary change due to transmission is 
typically set to zero. 
In cultural evolution, however, transmission is not necessarily unbiased in this manner. 
People typically transform cultural information they receive from others in non-random 
directions due to the structure and function of cognition. This was formalised by Boyd 
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and Richerson (1985) in their models of ‘guided variation’, where an individual acquires a 
cultural trait from another individual, then modifies that trait in some non-random manner, 
before passing it on to another individual. The same process has been modelled using a 
Bayesian framework, where cognitive (or ‘inductive’) biases form the priors that people 
use when making inferences about culturally acquired information (Griffiths et al. 2008; 
Kirby et al. 2007). A group of cognitive anthropologists led by Dan Sperber (Boyer 1998; 
Claidière and Sperber 2007; Sperber 1996) have also emphasised the importance of this 
individual transformation due to cognitive biases, with Sperber coining the term ‘cultural 
attractor’ to describe a representation that is particularly likely to result from this individual
transformation2. 
Closely related, but formally distinct, are content biases (Henrich and McElreath 2003). 
These occur not via the transformation of information by individuals, but when individuals 
preferentially select certain cognitively appealing traits, without any modification or 
transformation. Content biases are therefore selection-like, because they change trait 
frequencies rather than the traits themselves. Both content biases and guided variation 
are likely to involve the same cognitive operations, but as Boyd and Richerson (1985) 
showed, they have different evolutionary dynamics: the strength of selection-like content 
biases, like selection in general, depends on the amount of variation in the population, 
while the strength of guided variation depends only on individual features of cognition 
rather than populational characteristics.
2 Some of this latter school (e.g. Claidiere, Scott-Phillips and Sperber 2014) have argued 
that the existence of these transformative processes requires a major revision of the 
standard approach to cultural evolution presented in this article; I deal with this critique 
separately in a later section.
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A wealth of experimental studies demonstrate the existence of these cognitive biases 
(incorporating guided variation and content biases). Several studies have used the 
‘transmission chain’ method (Bartlett 1932; Mesoudi and Whiten 2008) which 
experimentally simulates the transmission of cultural information along a chain of 
individuals, much like the children’s game Telephone. In the case of written material, for 
example, each person reads and recalls from memory what the previous person recalled, 
the new recall is given to the next person to remember, and so on along the chain.
Transmission chain studies have shown that certain kinds of information are preferentially 
transmitted. A result replicated by several independent labs is that information about 
social relationships is transmitted with higher fidelity than equivalent non-social 
information (McGuigan and Cubillo 2013; Mesoudi et al. 2006; Reysen et al. 2011; 
Stubbersfield et al. 2014), as predicted by social brain theories of the biological evolution 
of primate cognition (Dunbar 2003). There is also experimental support for a bias for 
emotionally salient disgust-inducing information (Eriksson and Coultas 2014; Heath et al. 
2001). Xu et al. (2013), meanwhile, found that initially random colour terms transmitted 
along chains of people gradually converged on those colour terms commonly seen across
actual societies, arguing that the innate features of our perceptual system makes certain 
colours more salient and thus more likely to emerge through repeated transmission. 
These would all be examples of biases in cultural evolution that have roots in biologically-
evolved features of individual human cognition and perception, resulting from naturally 
selected adaptations for living in complex groups (social bias), protecting against disease 
(disgust bias), and innate features of our perceptual systems (colour perception).
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Other transmission chain studies have shown how the structure of cognition shapes 
culturally transmitted information as a result of repeated transmission. Mesoudi and 
Whiten (2004) showed that detailed descriptions of events become systematically 
‘schematized’ during transmission, i.e. low-level details such as names and dates are lost 
as material is transformed into more generic higher-level knowledge. Similar effects have 
been found for gender and racial stereotypes (Kashima 2000; Martin et al. 2014), with 
stereotype-inconsistent information gradually transformed into simpler, stereotype-
consistent information. Kirby et al. (2008) showed how a similar process can shape 
grammatical features of languages, by demonstrating that artificial languages transmitted 
along chains of people gradually become more learnable, and in so doing come to 
possess features of actual languages, such as compositionality, that are typically thought 
of as innate. 
Transmission chain experiments have also been performed with non-human species 
(Whiten and Mesoudi 2008). Interestingly, similar inductive biases to those observed by 
Kirby et al. (2008) have been shown in songbirds, where repeated learning constraints 
generate structure in songs in the same way that repeated learning constraints generate 
structure in languages (Feher et al. 2009).
As noted previously, Darwinian population thinking allows us to link individual-level biases
to population-level patterns. The cognitive biases discussed in this section are consistent 
with certain patterns of cultural diversity observed in ethnographic and historical records 
(Sperber and Hirschfeld 2004). An individual-level disgust bias may therefore explain the 
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prevalence of disgusting information in real-life urban legends (Heath et al. 2001), while 
near-universal aspects of grammar and colour terminology can be explained in terms of 
repeated transmission constraints (Kirby et al. 2008; Xu et al. 2013). A key finding of many
of these studies is that weak individual biases can be easily magnified at the population 
level, in a way that could not be anticipated by focusing on individual cognition alone.
Demography can influence the evolution of cultural complexity
Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) explored how demographic factors such as population
size and migration can influence cultural evolution just as they can influence biological 
evolution. In the last decade this has been pursued further, primarily in the 
historical/archaeological study of past cultural change, where the influence of changing 
demography can be observed over long time periods.
Henrich (2004) presented Tasmania as an example of the influence of demography on 
cultural evolution. When Tasmanian settlers became cut off from the Australian mainland 
around 10,000 years ago, they lost many complex tools and skills including winter 
clothing, fishing spears and boomerangs. Henrich (2004) argued that this loss of complex 
culturally-transmitted traits was due to the reduced effective population size that occurred
following isolation from the mainland population. In smaller populations, there are fewer 
skilled individuals from whom to learn, and fewer individuals to make rare beneficial 
modifications.
To formalise this, Henrich (2004) introduced an influential model linking population size to 
cultural complexity. The latter he defined in abstract terms designed to represent a 
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quantitative measure of skill in some task, such as basket-weaving ability or stone tool 
production accuracy. In the model, each new generation acquires the skill of the most-
skilful member of the previous generation (i.e. they exhibit payoff biased social learning) 
with some error. This error has two components, one that determines the loss of skill due 
to imperfect copying, and one that represents attempts to improve the skill. Complexity 
increases with population size because the more individuals there are, the more likely 
someone is to make an improvement without significant transmission error (see also 
Kobayashi and Aoki 2012; Mesoudi 2011c; Vaesen 2012).
Shennan (2001) and Powell et al. (2009) applied similar models directly to archaeological 
data regarding Palaeolithic Europe, showing that the appearance and disappearance of 
complex technological and social traits such as abstract art, the bow and musical 
instruments all coincide with changes in population density. Other studies have used 
repeated founder effect models to explain declining diversity in Acheulean handaxes with 
distance from an East African origin (Lycett and von Cramon-Taubadel 2008), shown that 
island population size predicts the size and complexity of fishing technology in the Pacific
(Kline and Boyd 2010), and found that across Polynesian languages new words are more 
likely to be gained by larger populations and existing words are more likely to be lost in 
smaller populations (Bromham et al. 2015). Not all studies have found a link between 
population size and cultural complexity, however: Collard et al. (2013), for example, did 
not find a link in populations of North American hunter gatherers. More mobile hunter-
gatherers may experience fewer cultural benefits from large population sizes than 
sedentary agriculturalists.
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Recently, the link between population size and cultural complexity has been explored 
experimentally. Henrich’s (2004) original model contained certain assumptions concerning
the micro-level link between demography and complexity (e.g. payoff-biased social 
learning), but large-scale archaeological studies such as Powell et al. (2009) can only test 
the outcome of this model, not the validity of the mechanisms. Derex et al. (2013), 
Muthukrishna et al. (2014) and Kempe and Mesoudi (2014) all found that, as predicted, 
larger groups containing more individuals from whom to learn supported higher levels of 
cultural complexity in various tasks, including designing computerised fishing nets, knot-
tying, and completing jigsaw puzzles. While Derex et al. (2013) and Muthukrishna et al. 
(2014) showed that Henrich’s (2004) payoff-biased mechanism works, Kempe and 
Mesoudi (2014) showed that the effect can also be seen when people integrate the 
solutions of other people into a single solution (a kind of ‘blending inheritance’). Further 
work is needed to delineate the precise micro-evolutionary mechanisms that support the 
macroevolutionary link between population size and cultural complexity.
Phylogenetic methods can reconstruct language macroevolution
As noted previously, another major strand of cultural evolution research has applied 
phylogenetic methods to reconstruct the evolutionary relationships between culturally-
transmitted traits, based on the principle of inheritance. Much of this work has focused on
reconstructing language evolution (Pagel 2009). While historical linguists before Darwin 
were constructing language family trees based on the assumption of common descent, 
this endeavour continued largely separately from evolutionary science throughout the 
20th century, resulting in trees based on the subjective judgement of linguists as to what 
languages were most similar, and what changes were most likely (McMahon and 
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McMahon 2003). 
In the last decade, sophisticated phylogenetic methods developed in evolutionary biology
have been applied to the many language datasets already assembled by linguists, in 
many cases resulting in significant advances in our understanding of language evolution. 
A good example is the origin of the Indo-European language family, described as “the 
most intensively studied, yet still the most recalcitrant, problem of historical linguistics” 
(Diamond and Bellwood 2003, p. 601). Two major hypotheses proposed by linguists are 
the “steppe hypothesis”, that Indo-European languages originated in the Pontic-Caspian 
steppe region (modern Kazakhstan) with the expansion into Europe of seminomadic 
Kurgan horsemen around 5000-6000 years ago, and the “Anatolian hypothesis”, which 
posits an older origin around 8000-9500 years ago in Anatolia (modern Turkey) and a 
spread associated with farming. Both hypotheses are consistent with the archaeological 
record, and are fiercely argued over amongst historical linguists (Diamond and Bellwood 
2003).
Building on an earlier phylogenetic analysis (Gray and Atkinson 2003), Bouckaert et al. 
(2012) used spatially-explicit Bayesian phylogenetic (i.e. phylogeographic) methods to 
test these hypotheses. Cognates (homologous words) from 103 extinct and extant Indo-
European languages were used to infer the most likely phylogeny given known past and 
present geographic ranges, with language range modelled as evolving over time along the
branches of the phylogeny. Bouckaert et al. (2012) found strong support for the Anatolian 
hypothesis: the estimated posterior distribution of the root of the Indo-European 
phylogeny was located in Anatolia and dated to 7,000-10,500 years ago. This conclusion 
23
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
was robust to several different assumptions about the spread of the languages, such as 
the likelihood of migration across water bodies (although see Chang et al. (2015) for an 
alternative conclusion).
Similar phylogenetic analyses have been applied to the spread of Austronesian languages
across the Pacific (Gray et al. 2009; Gray and Jordan 2000). These suggest an origin 
around 5,500 years ago in Taiwan with a subsequent series of rapid expansion pulses 
interspersed by settlement pauses (the “pulse-pause” hypothesis), rather than an 
alternative “slow-boat” hypothesis that posits an earlier origin in Wallacea (modern-day 
Sulawesi) around 13-17,000 years ago. Moreover, internal branch lengths were used to 
identify the specific pulses and pauses in the Austronesian expansion, which were then 
linked to the emergence of specific technologies such as outrigger canoes that allowed 
migration from Taiwan to the Philippines (Gray et al. 2009).
The comparative method can test functional hypotheses about cultural evolution
Biologists typically use phylogenies not simply to reconstruct the past, but also to test 
functional hypotheses about evolution by comparing traits across different species. This 
comparative method (Felsenstein 1985; Harvey and Pagel 1991) uses phylogenies to 
correct for the non-independence of data due to shared descent when comparing across 
species. The comparative method can also be used in cultural evolution, comparing traits 
across different societies and using language phylogenies to control for non-
independence due to descent (Mace and Pagel 1994). Although anthropologists have 
long been aware of this problem of non-independence (known as ‘Galton’s Problem’, after
Francis Galton pointed it out in 1889), during the 20th century socio-cultural 
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anthropologists abandoned the practice of comparing across societies in order to test 
functional hypotheses, preferring to describe individual societies within interpretivist or 
post-modern frameworks.
Galton’s problem was therefore left for biologists to solve, but since Mace and Pagel 
(1994) the comparative method as developed in biology has also been applied to cultural 
datasets. For example, Holden and Mace (2003) showed that, in 68 Bantu-speaking sub-
Saharan African societies, the introduction of cattle-keeping in formerly horticulturalist 
societies led to a shift from matrilineal to patrilineal wealth inheritance. This shift makes 
functional sense because, in these societies, cows are more useful to sons than 
daughters, and therefore lead to more male-biased parental investment. Cows are more 
useful to sons because grooms must pay bridewealth to the bride’s family in order to 
marry. Once cows are being kept, then wealth can be accumulated in the form of herd 
size, and families with larger herds can offer a larger bridewealth.
A similar comparative phylogenetic analysis was conducted by Currie et al. (2010) for 
changes in political complexity in Austronesian-speaking societies in the Pacific over the 
last 5,500 years, given the newly available Austronesian language phylogenies discussed 
above (Gray et al. 2009). Ethnographic data was used to classify societies based on the 
number of hierarchical decision-making levels, from one (an egalitarian society with no 
leaders), to more than two levels (what ethnographers define as ‘states’). Currie et al. 
showed that the best-fitting model of political evolution is one where complexity 
increases incrementally by one level at a time (precluding leaps from, say, one level to 
three), but with the possibility of sudden collapses from any level down to one3. 
3 Earlier I discussed 19th century progressive Spencerian theories of cultural evolution. 
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Controversies, criticisms and challenges
Despite the growth in cultural evolution research, the theory has also been much criticised
by both social and evolutionary scientists. In this section I explore these criticisms, 
beginning with what I consider to be relatively minor issues of misunderstanding that have
been addressed in the literature, then moving on to more substantive challenges and 
ongoing debates.
Misunderstandings and clarifications
The following criticisms, in my view at least, have been addressed earlier in the article or 
elsewhere in the literature, but it is worth highlighting them again as they represent 
continued sources of misunderstanding.
 Cultural evolution is not progressive: As noted above, many social scientists still 
identify cultural evolution with progressive Spencerian theories, and reject modern 
cultural evolution by rejecting the notion of inevitable progress (e.g. Fracchia and 
Lewontin 1999). As noted, this represents a misunderstanding of modern cultural 
Currie et al.’s (2010) analysis presents an interesting empirical test of a version of those 
claims that societies increase in complexity, although it should be noted that (i) Currie et 
al.’s analysis is an empirical test, whereas Tylor and Morgan offered little empirical 
support for their progressive schemes; (ii) Currie et al. precisely defined ‘complexity’ in 
terms of political hierarchy, whereas Tylor and Morgan were vague and conflated social 
organisation, technology and many other traits into a single scheme; and (iii) Currie et al. 
showed that cultural evolution is not inevitably progressive, in that societies often lost 
social hierarchical levels.  
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evolution theory, which is not Spencerian or progressive.
 Culture is too complex for simple models: Modern cultural evolution research is 
often criticised on the grounds that the population-genetic-style models at the core
of the field are inappropriate for capturing the complexity of cultural phenomena 
(Fracchia and Lewontin 1999). Largely this represents a misunderstanding of the 
use of formal models. Just as in biology (Servedio et al. 2014), models are not 
intended to simulate all aspects of reality, nor are they arguments that the real 
world really is simple; they are used to formalise the logic of verbal arguments 
about a complex world (Richerson and Boyd 1987). 
 Culture cannot be divided into memes: It is common for cultural evolution to be 
rejected on the grounds that culture cannot be divided into discrete units of 
inheritance (e.g. Bloch 2000). As noted above, this again rests on a 
misunderstanding: Darwinian evolution does not require discrete replicators, and 
many cultural evolution models assume the blending inheritance of continuously 
varying cultural traits (Henrich and Boyd 2002).
 Biological evolution branches, cultural evolution blends: A critique of cultural 
phylogenetics is that while biological macroevolution is a process of population 
fissioning into distinct lineages, cultural macroevolution frequently involves cross-
lineage exchange via migration or trade, thus invalidating phylogenetic methods 
(Moore 1994). This distinction is unfounded: biological systems also feature cross-
lineage exchange in the form of horizontal gene transfer (Syvanen 2012), and 
empirical tests demonstrate that many cultural datasets show just as strong 
phylogenetic signal as biological datasets (Collard et al. 2006). Moreover, 
Bayesian-MCMC methods can explicitly detect and handle cross-lineage 
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borrowing (Matthews et al. 2011).
Is culture proximate or ultimate?
Cultural evolution researchers are sometimes accused of making overblown claims about 
the causal role of culture in explaining human behaviour (Dickins and Rahman 2012; El 
Mouden et al. 2014; Scott-Phillips et al. 2011). This is typically placed within the context 
of the proximate-ultimate distinction (Mayr 1961; Tinbergen 1963). Proximate (or “how”) 
causes of biological phenomena are immediate mechanisms and triggering stimuli, while 
ultimate (or “why”) causes concern the evolutionary history and function of a trait. For 
example, proximate causes of birdsong might include the anatomical features that allow 
birds to sing, or the presence of a rival bird. Ultimate causes of birdsong might include 
descent from an ancestral lineage in which birdsong was present, and the selection 
pressures that gave rise to and maintain birdsong. Biological phenomena can be 
simultaneously explained at both proximate and ultimate levels.
How does culture fit into this scheme? Researchers coming from sociobiology and 
evolutionary psychology have typically argued that culture is proximate: a mechanism set 
up by genes to maximise inclusive fitness (Dickins and Rahman 2012; El Mouden et al. 
2014; Scott-Phillips et al. 2011). There is merit in this argument: after all, the capacity for 
culture evolved genetically because it increased inclusive fitness, as explored by 
numerous gene-culture coevolution analyses (Boyd and Richerson 1985, 1995). Moreover,
many of the cognitive biases discussed above have putative inclusive fitness benefits, 
such as keeping track of social relationships (Mesoudi et al. 2006) and learning about 
disease-carrying substances (Eriksson and Coultas 2014).
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Others (myself included) have argued that non-genetic forms of inheritance such as 
cultural evolution can additionally constitute ultimate causes of behaviour and thus 
require a rethinking of the original proximate-ultimate scheme (Danchin et al. 2011; Laland
et al. 2011; Mesoudi et al. 2013). For a non-cultural species, the original scheme is fairly 
straightforward: ultimate historical causes involve genetic lineages connected via genetic 
descent, and ultimate selective causes involve the natural selection of genetic variation. 
For a cultural species such as ours, however, ultimate historical causes may also involve 
cultural lineages connected via cultural descent, and ultimate selective causes may also 
involve the cultural selection of cultural variation.
For example, the question “why does a person living in England speak English, and a 
person living in France speak French?” cannot satisfactorily be answered in terms of 
genetic differences or natural selection; it must be answered in terms of cultural descent 
(being descended from a cultural lineage of English or French-speakers on the tips of the 
Indo-European language phylogeny), and in terms of cultural selection (the 
microevolutionary processes that caused the languages to change and diversify over 
time, which might include both selection-like social learning biases and cultural drift). In 
cases of gene-culture coevolution, culturally transmitted traits such as dairy farming have 
caused the spread of genes such as lactose tolerance (Laland et al. 2010), again blurring 
a simple framework in which natural selection of genes is the ultimate cause of 
evolutionary change.
While to some extent these issues are merely semantic (i.e. how different researchers 
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define ‘proximate’ and ‘ultimate’), definitional and theoretical frameworks are important 
because they guide the research questions that are asked. At the heart of this debate is 
the extent to which culture is under genetic control: if culture is proximate then it should 
be under tight genetic control, always (or almost always) resulting in behaviour that 
maximises inclusive genetic fitness. If cultural evolution can also play an ultimate role, 
then it may drive behaviour to novel equilibrium that are not necessarily genetically 
optimal, or predictable from evolutionary models containing purely genetic inheritance.
The relative influence of transformative and selective processes
Earlier I noted that cultural evolution differs from biological evolution in that whereas 
genetic inheritance does not in itself generate evolutionary change (except in unusual 
cases such as meiotic drive or imprinting), cultural inheritance (i.e. social learning) itself 
may do so, through the individual transformation of information. This difference has 
inspired some researchers to suggest an alternative framework for modelling and 
understanding cultural change, one based on ‘cultural attraction’ (Claidière et al. 2014; 
Claidière and Sperber 2007; Sperber 1996).
Two definitions of ‘cultural attraction’ exist in the writings of Sperber and colleagues 
(Acerbi and Mesoudi in press). In some publications (e.g. Claidière and Sperber 2007), 
cultural attraction equates to individual transformation, and seems equivalent to guided 
variation as modelled by Boyd and Richerson (1985). Claidiere and Sperber (2007), for 
example, present a model in which a cultural trait - cigarette smoking - is influenced by 
both cultural attraction, where people are individually more likely to decide to either 
smoke zero or 25 cigarettes a day due to the initial unpleasantness and addictiveness of 
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smoking, and cultural selection, which takes the form of a model-based bias wherein 
people are more likely to copy 10-cigarette-a-day smokers. As one might expect, the final
distribution of cigarette smoking depends on the relative strength of cultural attraction 
(guided variation) and cultural selection (model-based bias).
As noted, this sense of cultural attraction seems synonymous with Boyd and Richerson’s 
(1985) guided variation, and transformative processes have been much studied in the field
using transmission chain methods. There does not seem to be any major disagreement 
here, and indeed Sperber and colleagues have made a valuable contribution in 
highlighting the importance of transformative processes. One might argue about the 
relative strength of transformative and selective processes in cultural evolution, and this is
an empirical question that cannot be addressed through modelling alone. Experimental 
studies are beginning to examine this (Eriksson and Coultas 2014), but more field and 
historical studies are needed. It is likely that for certain domains where there are strong 
cognitive constraints or biases, then individual transformation will dominate, such as the 
case of colour terminology studied by Xu et al. (2013). In other domains, particularly those
involving complex, novel or rapidly changing cultural traits, there are unlikely to be any 
innate cognitive or perceptual biases operating, and cultural traits may be so ‘cognitively 
opaque’ (Csibra and Gergely 2009) - i.e. cannot be easily reconstructed or understood - 
that individual transformation would be unlikely to result in beneficial modification any 
more than chance (Boyd et al. 2011). This likely includes  complex technologies that have 
accumulated over multiple generations and that were shown above to appear and 
disappear with demography, such as fishing hooks, bows, and modern technology such 
as computers and spacecraft. Here, selection-like processes such as payoff-biased social
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learning, plus random cultural mutation, are likely to be more important than individual 
transformation.
Elsewhere (e.g. Claidière et al. 2014), cultural attraction appears to become synonymous 
with the broad process of cultural evolution. Claidiere et al. (2014), for example, argue that
“cultural evolution is best described in terms of a process called cultural attraction ..., 
which is populational and evolutionary, but only selectional under certain circumstances.” 
(Claidière et al. 2014, p. 2). Here, cultural selection is described as a “special case” of 
cultural attraction, which subsumes both transformative and selective processes. This 
broader sense of cultural attraction seems to be redundant, and confusingly redefines the
notion of cultural attraction (Acerbi and Mesoudi in press). Claidiere et al. (2014) present 
evolutionary causal matrices, a modelling scheme which they argue better represents 
cultural change compared to existing ‘selectional’ models, but it is unclear how useful 
these are compared to the already established models of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 
(1981), Boyd and Richerson (1985) and many others, which as we have seen are not, in 
fact, exclusively selectional and also include transformative processes.
What underlies cumulative cultural evolution?
Many species possess social learning, defined as the transmission of information non-
genetically from one individual to another (Galef and Laland 2005). Many species also 
exhibit cultural traditions, defined as group differences generated by social learning 
(Lycett et al. 2007; Whiten et al. 1999). Only humans, however, appear to possess 
cumulative cultural evolution, defined as the accumulation of beneficial modifications over
successive generations (Dean et al. 2014). Different groups of chimpanzees may differ in 
32
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
their nut-cracking behaviour (Whiten et al. 1999), but there is no sense in which nut-
cracking has accumulated over successive generations such that it is beyond the 
inventive capacity of a single chimp. Aspects of human culture, such as spacecraft, 
quantum physics, and financial markets, are the cumulative product of countless 
individuals over many generations.
There is ongoing comparative, experimental and modelling work trying to explain this 
difference between humans and other species. An initial suggestion that non-human 
species lack high-fidelity imitation, i.e. the copying of motor actions (Tomasello et al. 
1993), failed to find support when chimpanzees were shown able to faithfully transmit 
behaviours through captive groups (Horner et al. 2006). Recent work has instead 
implicated multiple factors as being jointly necessary. A recent experimental study 
pointed to a suite of socio-cognitive abilities, including imitation, verbal instruction and 
cooperation, that permitted human children to solve cumulative tasks that chimpanzees 
and capuchins failed (Dean et al. 2012). Theoretical models linked to comparative data 
suggest that transmission fidelity and population size are jointly necessary for cumulative 
cultural evolution (Kempe et al. 2014). Certainly, if the confluence of multiple social, 
cognitive and demographic factors was necessary for the evolution of cumulative cultural 
evolution, then this may well explain its rarity in nature. Future comparative work will 
provide a better understanding of these factors.
The evolution of large-scale human cooperation
A fiercely debated question across the biological sciences concerns the evolutionary 
basis of cooperation (Abbot et al. 2011; Nowak et al. 2010). Human large-scale 
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cooperation between unrelated individuals has come under particularly intense scrutiny. 
Boyd and Richerson (1985), alongside their general models of cultural evolution, also 
presented a theory of cultural group selection to explain human cooperation. In their 
original formulation, social learning biases such as conformity generate within-group 
cultural homogeneity and between-group cultural variation. If this group-level cultural 
variation persists in the face of migration, if groups vary in altruistic cultural traits which 
benefit the group but are costly to the individual, and if selection acts at the level of the 
group such as via their differential extinction, then this process of cultural group selection 
may favour altruistic cultural norms (Boyd and Richerson 2009). Empirical support for the 
cultural group selection hypothesis includes behavioural economic games which show 
cooperation in one-shot, anonymous interactions with no possibility of reciprocity, and 
between-group cultural variation in the extent of this cooperative behaviour (Henrich et al.
2005).
Cultural group selection has been criticised along with other theories of group (or 
multilevel) selection (e.g. Wilson and Wilson 2007) by proponents of kin selection (West et 
al. 2007, 2011). The latter argue that all human cooperation, like non-human cooperation, 
ultimately has selfish benefits to the individual, even if these benefits also occur to those 
individuals’ groups. Cooperation in one-shot anonymous games is argued to be an 
artifact of the unfamiliarity of such situations (West et al. 2007).
Cultural group selection is an elegant theory that fits with many findings from across the 
social and behavioral sciences (Richerson et al. 2015). Of the few empirical studies that 
have aimed to directly test its underlying assumptions, some have found support (Bell et 
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al. 2009) while others have not (Lamba 2014; Lamba and Mace 2011). It is also worth 
noting that prominent cultural evolution researchers remain sceptical of the specific 
theory of cultural group selection (Lehmann et al. 2008). No doubt future empirical tests 
will further clarify the nature of human cooperation.
Are social learning biases learned or innate?
Many gene-culture coevolutionary models have looked at the evolution of social learning, 
and of different social learning biases such as payoff or conformist biases. These models 
typically assume that such capacities are genetically-specified, and examine when each 
would be favoured by natural selection. To pick one example of many, Enquist et al. 
(2007) assume in a model of the evolution of social learning that “Which [learning] 
strategy is used is genetically determined for each individual” (p.6). 
It is possible, however, that the degree of social learning employed by an individual is 
itself learned, either individually or socially. To an extent, models such as those of Enquist 
et al. (2007) do not require social learning to be genetically-specified in order for the 
insights of their models to be valid: social learning could equally be acquired from others 
culturally, without perhaps altering the results of the model. On the other hand, given the 
known differences between the dynamics of genetic and cultural inheritance, this may not
necessarily be the case. In subsequent models, Enquist and colleagues explored this 
further (Acerbi et al. 2009; Ghirlanda et al. 2006), showing that when the tendency to 
engage in social learning can itself be socially learned, this gradually reduces individuals’ 
reliance on social information. This is because while social learners may learn from non-
social learners to become non-social learners, the reverse is less likely: non-social 
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learners do not learn from social learners because, by definition, they do not learn 
socially. While this specific result may or may not be broadly applicable, it highlights the 
possibility that cultural dynamics may be significantly altered when one assumes that 
social learning can itself be socially learned.
Empirically, Mesoudi et al. (2015) showed that the tendency to engage in social learning in
an experimental artifact-design task varies cross-culturally, with participants from 
mainland China more likely to use social information than participants from the UK and 
Hong Kong, as well as Chinese immigrants living in the UK. Although further studies are 
needed to explore the precise determinants of human social information use, these 
results suggest that social learning tendencies are themselves learned from others; the 
Western-style learning of Chinese immigrants and Hong Kong residents in particular 
count against any genetic basis for learning style.
In the non-human literature, too, it has been argued that social learning can be explained 
in terms of simple associative learning mechanisms, rather than dedicated genetically-
specified, domain-specific mechanisms (Heyes 2012; Heyes and Pearce 2015; 
Leadbeater 2015). Recent studies have shown that social learning in rats can be 
influenced by early developmental cues such as maternal care (Lindeyer et al. 2013), and 
in bees by past learning histories (Dawson et al. 2013). However, while similar processes 
may well operate in humans (Heyes 2012), it is difficult to explain the species differences 
in cumulative cultural evolution described above without positing some kind of genetic 
adaptation in the human lineage, perhaps involving the extent of imitation during 
childhood (Lyons et al. 2007) or theory of mind (Tomasello et al. 2005).
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Conclusions
In this paper I have provided an overview of contemporary cultural evolution research. 
The details of cultural micro-evolution are becoming increasingly better understood 
through a combination of theoretical models, lab experiments and field studies. These 
focus on pathways and biases in social learning, examining who people learn from, what 
they learn, and how learning transforms transmitted information. Macro-evolutionary 
studies are also proliferating, with sophisticated analyses of the evolution of languages, 
technology and social organisation giving valuable insights into broad patterns of cultural 
change through human history and prehistory.
Major progress is likely to occur through the linking of cultural micro and macroevolution, 
just as occurred in biology during the evolutionary synthesis. This is greatly facilitated by 
the quantitative models of cultural evolution that lie at the heart of the field, as the large-
scale, population-level consequences of individual-level learning processes can be 
explored in a manner that verbal models do not allow. Thus we have seen links made 
from payoff bias and demography to patterns of cumulative cultural evolution, from 
transformative cognitive biases to cross-cultural universals such as colour terminologies 
and grammatical structure, and from conformist bias to large-scale cooperation. 
Much of the work presented here is consistent with existing findings in the non-
evolutionary social sciences: language phylogenies are broadly consistent with informal 
trees constructed by linguists, for example, while social learning biases such as 
conformity have precedent in the work of social psychologists. The added value of 
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viewing cultural change as an evolutionary process lies in (i) the application to cultural 
datasets of quantitative methods already developed by biologists, such as phylogenetic 
methods in linguistics, where previously inferences were subjective; (ii) the grounding of 
human behaviour within a broader evolutionary framework, such as the use of formal 
models to explore the adaptiveness of different social learning biases; and (iii) the linking 
of micro- and macro-levels of explanation, which is inherent in Darwinian population 
thinking but represents a perennial problem in the social sciences due to the lack of 
quantitative methods for making this link, and the lack of communication between 
disciplines that focus on the micro (e.g. psychology) and those that focus on the macro 
(e.g. history or archaeology). 
For evolutionary biologists, cultural evolution is significant for several reasons. First, the 
existence of a second major evolutionary process that resembles genetic evolution but 
differs from it in important ways may well provide valuable insights into the processes of 
genetic evolution. Phylogenetic methods, for example, are now being developed in 
parallel for both cultural and genetic data (Pagel 2009), and phenomena common to 
cultural datasets such as cross-lineage borrowing is just as much a challenge for 
biologists facing phenomena such as horizontal gene transfer. Second, social learning is 
now recognised to be common across multiple taxa, not just humans. The existence of a 
second inheritance system - and potentially a third, if one also includes transgenerational 
epigenetic inheritance - means that standard explanations for phenotypic variation in 
terms purely of the natural selection of genetically-inherited variation will not be sufficient 
(Danchin et al. 2011). Finally, when considering explanations for human behaviour, 
biologists sometimes consider ‘culture’ to be a vague and imprecise notion, instead 
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defaulting to explaining patterns of human behaviour in terms of genes and natural 
selection even where this is inappropriate. The work reviewed here should hopefully put 
rest to that feeling, by presenting a coherent evolutionary science of culture that is just as 
rigorous as evolutionary biology.
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